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USING WESTERN LAW TO IMPROVE CHINA’S 
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES:  OF 
TAKEOVERS AND SECURITIES FRAUD 
Guanghua Yu* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since 1978, the Chinese Government has tried various means, such 
as using Western law, to improve the inefficiency of State-owned 
enterprises (“SOEs”).  Despite these efforts, the poor performance of 
SOEs at the macro-level has persisted.1  However, the source of the poor 
performance remains less clear.  The proper question is, “If a privately 
owned firm is socialized, and nothing else changes, how will the 
ownership change alone affect the firm’s behavior?”2  The question of 
ownership change is further complicated because government in 
industry is often associated with the suppression of competition, making 
it problematic as to whether public ownership or the suppression of 
competition is driving poor performance.3  Research in the property 
rights tradition4 and agency costs tradition5 suggests that there will be 
performance differences between government and private ownership 
because of a broad menu of monitoring mechanisms associated with 
private ownership.  The underlying premise is that “[b]ehavior under 
public and private ownership is different because even with the same 
                                                 
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong and Guest Professor, 
Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics; S.J.D., University of Toronto, 1996; J.D., 
University of Toronto, 1993; LL. M., Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 1988; B.A., 
Shanghai Maritime University, 1985. 
1 Gang Fan & Wing Thye Woo, State Enterprise Reform as a Source of Macroeconomic 
Instability:  The Case of China, 10 ASIAN ECON. J. 207 (1996) (arguing that SOEs were an 
important contributing factor of macroeconomic instability); see WORLD BANK, THE CHINESE 
ECONOMY:  FIGHTING INFLATION, DEPENDING REFORMS 15-7 (1996); WORLD BANK, CHINA’S 
MANAGEMENT OF ENTERPRISE ASSETS:  THE STATE AS SHAREHOLDER (1997). 
2 Sam Peltzman, Pricing in Public and Private Enterprises:  Electric Utilities in the United 
States, 14 J. L. & ECON. 109, 110 (1971). 
3 Scott E. Atkinson & Robert Halvorsen, The Relative Efficiency of Public and Private Firms 
in a Regulated Environment:  The Case of U.S. Electric Utilities, 29 J. PUB ECON. 281 (1986). 
4 See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demestz, Production, Information, and Economic 
Organization,  62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972). 
5 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
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explicit organizational goals, the costs-rewards system impinging upon 
the employees and the ‘owners’ of the organization are different.”6 
Different results were found after studying a sample of nationalized 
companies in Japan and Germany in which the U.S. government held 
thirty-five to one hundred percent of the outstanding common shares 
between one and twenty-three years during and following World War 
II. 7   The study indicated that the economic performance of the 
government-owned companies was not significantly different than that 
of private-sector firms in the same industry. 8   Hence, the interim 
government custodianship of the firms in the study did not cause the 
effects normally attributed to government ownership.  The study has 
limitations, however.  First, the firms in the sample were subject to 
interim custodianship by the U.S. government rather than full-fledged 
government ownership.  Second, the firms in the sample were eventually 
reprivatized.  Third, the study did not have enough degrees of freedom 
to calibrate the relative importance of the monitoring mechanisms such 
as competitive markets, monitoring shareholders, and external valuation 
faced by the government in that case. 
It has also been argued that, in addition to the lack of means to 
motivate or discipline agents in public organizations, public actors will 
pursue socially undesirable ends because of political self interest.9 
This Article focuses, from an agency perspective, on Chinese SOEs 
that provide non-public goods or services.  However, establishing 
various market mechanisms by utilizing Western law to improve the 
inefficiency of the SOEs is difficult.  This Article argues that China 
cannot achieve the goal of using Western law to improve the inefficiency 
of SOEs unless the State withdraws or considerably reduces its 
ownership in the large number of State-owned listed companies.   
After examining the reform of SOEs since 1978, Part II examines the 
problems in establishing an efficient market of corporate control despite 
transplanting of a Western-type takeover law.10  Part III discusses the 
                                                 
6 Armen A. Alchian, Some Economics of Property Rights, in ECONOMIC FORCES AT WORK 
127-149 (1977). 
7 Stacey R. Kole & J. Harold Mulherin, The Government as a Shareholder:  A Case from the 
United States, 30 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1997). 
8 Id. 
9 Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. Iacobucci, Privatization and Accountability, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 1422 (2003). 
10 See infra Part II. 
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wide-spread existence of securities fraud in the issuing of shares in State-
owned listed companies.11  While focusing on the difficulty of enforcing 
a Western-type securities law to show the inefficiency in the public 
provision of goods or services, this Article also raises the doubts on 
Martha Minow’s call for a public framework of accountability to be 
discussed in Part III.C.12  If a public framework of accountability cannot 
be developed to deal with the abuse in SOEs, it is unlikely that such a 
framework will be very useful for private companies in market 
economies.13  This Article concludes that the political goal of maintaining 
control of large SOEs in China makes it difficult to establish efficient 
market mechanisms or legal means to motivate or discipline agents in 
China’s SOEs.14  Further, this Article concludes that inefficient market or 
legal mechanisms adversely affect the performance of SOEs in China’s 
transitional economy.15  
II. THE HISTORY OF CHINA’S SOES AND THE LAW OF TAKEOVERS 
Although the reform of SOEs started in 1978, the performance of 
SOEs and banks remained poor in the 1980s and at the beginning of the 
1990s.  In 1987, losses incurred by State-owned, economically-
independent, industrial enterprises amounted to 6.1 billion yuan. 16  
These losses increased to 34.8 billion yuan in 1990, and to 45.2 billion 
yuan in 1993.17  During the first four months of 1994, 50.1% of these 
enterprises were running at a loss. 18   Despite slight performance 
improvements during the latter half of 1994, 34.4% of these SOEs were 
still running at a loss by the end of 1994.19  Overstocking products, chain 
defaulting of loans, and poor funds management had taken an 
increasingly heavier toll on the economic performance of enterprises.  
For instance, stockpiled products accounted for the loss of 412.4 billion 
                                                 
11 See infra Part III. 
12 See infra Part III.C (discussing Minow’s public framework of accountability). 
13 While the contractual and market mechanisms that can be used to motivate or 
discipline agents in companies include the capital, takeover, product, and managerial 
markets, shareholder monitoring, and creditor monitoring, this Article only examines 
takeover and capital markets. 
14 See infra Part IV. 
15 See infra Part IV. 
16 Project Group for the Establishment of a Modern Enter. Sys., Several Problems Related to 
the Establishment of a Modern Enterprise System, SOC. SC. P.R.C. 19, 20 (Winter 1996).  One 
U.S. dollar roughly equals 8.2 Chinese yuan. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
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yuan at the end of 1994.20  Most of these unpaid loans were used by 
medium to large-sized SOEs. 
Despite the reform of the financial sector, performance of banks 
remained poor at the beginning of the 1990s.  Overdue payments and 
non-performing loans were high.  While official reports indicated that 
overdue payments and non-performing loans accounted for fifteen 
percent of all credit offered by banks in 1992, 21  unofficial estimates 
showed that overdue payments and non-performing loans were close to 
forty percent of all outstanding loans. 22   The dominant means of 
financing SOEs through loans from State banks generated political risks 
when banks were unable to tighten the soft budget constraints of various 
loan users.23  
Soft budget constraints, and the legal prohibition against banks from 
owning shares in non-financial companies, required the use of 
alternative means of financing corporate activities.  The stock market 
was a natural selection.  It has been argued that if the share system were 
adopted, worker-owners would have greater incentives to improve their 
enterprises.24  It is also believed that stock market mechanisms were 
more efficient at rationalizing productive assets than the intermingling of 
government administration and enterprise management.25  Moreover, 
the creation of a stock market would give enterprises more financial 
responsibility since the worker-investors would have to bear the cost of 
losses from the beginning.26  China’s company law and stock market 
were, therefore, mainly designed to improve the performance of 
inefficient SOEs. 27   The takeover market, the market for corporate 
control, is sometimes claimed to be able to discipline inefficient 
                                                 
20 Id. 
21 Zhou Zhengqing, “Explanations Concerning the Commercial Banking Law of the PRC,” a 
Speech Delivered at the Ninth Session of the Eighth Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress on August 24, 1994, GAZETTE OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL 
PEOPLE’S CONGRESS 19, 20-21 (May 30, 1995). 
22 Interview with Mr. Cai, a middle level manager with the Bank of China, in Hangzhou, 
China (May 25, 1993). 
23 See Guanghua Yu, The Relevance of Comparative Corporate Governance Studies for China, 8 
AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 49, 79-80 (1997) (discussing the difficulty of enforcing the Bankruptcy 
Law in China in the 1990s).  See generally JANOS KORNAI, ECONOMICS OF  SHORTAGE (D.W. 
Jorgenson et al. eds. 1980) (discussing soft budget constraints). 
24 See Xu Jing’an, The State-Share System:  A New Avenue for China’s Economic Reform, 11 J. 
COMP. ECON. 509, 510 (1987). 
25 Id. at 513. 
26 Id. 
27 Robert C. Art & Minkang Gu, China Incorporated: The First Corporation Law of the 
People’s Republic of China, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 273, 307 (1995). 
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managers and improve the allocation of productive resources.  It is yet to 
be seen whether the use of an English-style takeover law will achieve 
such discipline and allocation. 
A. The Use of an English-Style Takeover Law 
China’s early takeover transactions were regulated by the Tentative 
Regulations on the Administration of the Issuing and Trading of Shares 
(“ITS”).28  In the ITS, provisions on takeovers were very similar to the 
Hong Kong Code on Takeovers and Mergers,29 which was itself based on 
the London City Code on Takeovers and Mergers.30  Despite only seven 
articles on takeovers in the ITS, the key provision, Article 48, is based on 
the London City Code.31  According to Article 48:  
[W]ithin 45 working days after any legal person’s (other 
than a promoter’s) direct or indirect holding of 
outstanding common shares in a listed company reaches 
30% of such company’s total outstanding common 
shares, such legal person shall make an offer of takeover 
to all the shareholders of such company, offering to 
purchase their shares through [cash] payment.32   
If a takeover is made, the higher of the following two prices should 
be adopted as the offer price: “(1) the highest price paid by the offeror for 
purchase of such shares during the 12 months preceeding the issuance of 
the takeover offer; [or] (2) the average market price of such shares during 
the 30 working days preceeding the issuance of the takeover offer.”33  I 
will call this provision the mandatory purchase provision.34 
                                                 
28 CHINA L. & PRAC. at 23 (August 1993) (providing an English translation of the ITS). 
29 The Securities and Futures Commission of Hong Kong, (P.R.C.), at http://www.hksfc. 
org.hk (last visited Oct. 28, 2004). 
30 The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers and the Rules Governing Substantial 
Acquisitions of Shares (U.K.), available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk (last visited 
Oct. 28, 2004) [hereinafter London City Code]. 
31 Id. art. 9.1. 
32 CHINA L. & PRAC., supra note 28, at 34 (art. 48).  SOEs and companies are legal persons, 
but branches and partnerships are not legal persons in Chinese law.  A legal person shall 
have the following qualifications: (1) establishment in accordance with the law; (2) 
possession of the necessary property or funds; (3) possession of its own name, 
organization, and premises; and (4) ability to independently bear civil liability.  The General 
Principles of Civil Law (art. 37), in THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 225 
(Foreign Languages Press 1987) (art. 37) [hereinafter General Principles]. 
33 General Principles, supra note 32, at 225. The current price provision in the Procedures 
on the Administration of the Takeover of Listed Companies issued by the China Securities 
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A few other provisions are related to the fair treatment of minority 
shareholders and are much easier to justify.  For instance, Article 50 
states that “[a]ll the conditions contained in a takeover offer shall apply 
to all the holders of the same kind of shares.” 35   Article 51 further 
clarifies that “[i]f the total number of shares that [offeror] offers to buy is 
less than the total number of shares for which the offer is preliminarily 
accepted, the offeror shall purchase such shares from the preliminarily 
accepting offeree [shareholders] on a pro rata basis.”36  Article 52 states:  
In the event of a change in any of the main conditions of 
offer after a takeover offer has been issued, the offeror 
shall promptly notify all offerees.  Such notification may 
be made in the form of a press conference or newspaper 
announcement or by another means of dissemination.  
During the term of a takeover offer and for a period of 
30 working days thereafter, the offeror may not 
purchase the shares in question on any conditions other 
than those set forth in the offer.37 
Still other provisions are related to disclosure and the facilitation of 
potential competing takeover offers.  Article 47 states that if a legal 
person holds, pursuant to the disclosure provision, directly or indirectly, 
more than five percent of the common shares of another listed company, 
a public announcement shall be made and a written report disclosing the 
fact shall be sent to the listed target company, the relevant stock 
exchange, and the China Securities Regulatory Commission (“CSRC”) 
within three working days from the date of acquisition.38  In addition, 
Article 47 states that any change of the above acquired shares of such a 
legal person reaching two percent will again trigger the reporting duty.39  
Such a legal person shall not directly or indirectly buy or sell shares of 
the target company within two working days from the announcement 
                                                                                                             
Regulatory Commission on September 28, 2002, follows the higher of the highest price the 
acquirer paid during the six months prior to the date of public announcement, or ninety 
percent of the arithmetic mean of the daily weighted average prices of the target company’s 
listed shares of that class during the thirty days prior to the date of public announcement.  
Administration of the Takeover of Listed Companies Procedures, CHINA L. & PRAC. 43 (Nov. 
2002) [hereinafter Administration]. 
34 See infra Part II.B (discussing the mandatory purchase provision). 
35 CHINA L. & PRAC., supra note 28, at 34 (art. 50). 
36 Id. at 35 (art. 51). 
37 Id. (art. 52). 
38 Id. at 33-34 (art. 47). 
39 Id. at 34 (art. 47).  The current position is five percent pursuant to the Securities Act of 
1998 instead of two percent. 
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date and before the submission of the report.40  According to Article 49, 
aimed at facilitating takeover offers, the takeover offer period, calculated 
from the offer-issuing date, shall not be less than thirty working days, 
and offerors shall not withdraw their takeover offers during the offer 
period.41  Furthermore, Article 53 states that the offeree shareholders 
have the right to withdraw their acceptances at any time during the offer 
period.42  As will be discussed later, the political goal of maintaining 
control over the large SOEs has made the disclosure provision and the 
provision for facilitating competing takeover offers irrelevant in the 
1990s.43 
B. Mandatory Purchase Provisions 
The mandatory purchase provision is a special feature of the 
English-style takeover law.  U.S. takeover law does not have such a 
provision.  The rationale behind the mandatory purchase provision is 
equality in the treatment of minority shareholders.  If an acquiring 
company pays a premium to the majority, block, or some shareholder(s) 
in a target when purchasing their shares, the acquiring company will 
also be required to extend the same premium to the minority 
shareholders in the target company.  An introductory provision in the 
London City Code reflects this policy concern.  Section 1(a) stipulates 
that the Code is “designed principally to ensure fair and equal treatment 
of all shareholders in relation to takeovers.”44  This rationale, however, is 
based on an unrealistic assumption that whatever the law, the number of 
takeovers will not be reduced.  The provision takes the ex post view that 
the gains from takeovers should be shared equally by all the 
shareholders in the target once a takeover occurs.45  
The mandatory purchase provision can be evaluated by the 
autonomy value and the welfare value.  Neither criterion can justify this 
premium sharing provision.  From a Nozickian rights-based approach, a 
                                                 
40 Id. (art. 47). 
41 Id. (art. 49). 
42 Id. at 35 (art. 52). 
43 See infra Part IV. 
44 London City Code, available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk (last visited 
Oct. 28, 2004). 
45 See Gregg Jarrell et al., The Market for Corporate Control:  The Empirical Evidence Since 
1980, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 49 (1988); Michael Jensen & Richard Ruback, The Market for Corporate 
Control:  The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983) (providing empirical evidence that 
takeovers are more likely to produce social gains). 
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distinction is made between threats and offers.46  Threats reduce the 
possibilities open to the recipient of a proposal, whereas offers expand 
them.  Threats are therefore coercive, while offers are not.  From that 
perspective, takeovers would seem properly viewed as offers rather than 
as threats.  The possibility of having a new management team indicates 
that takeovers increase target shareholders’ possibilities relative to their 
positions prior to their interactions with the acquirer.  Without 
takeovers, shareholders in target companies may stay with these 
companies while the company stagnates or simply dies from insolvency.  
Even the threat of takeovers disciplines managers in a potential target 
company. 
Despite the conclusion that takeover transactions enlarge 
shareholders’ contractual possibilities, and despite the overwhelming 
empirical evidence that shareholders of target companies receive 
abnormal returns resulting from takeover transactions, an enormous 
body of academic writing has focused on the problem of coercion in 
takeovers, particularly in partial bids. 47   It has been noted that 
“demonstrated examples of coercion remain as rare as confirmed 
sightings of the Loch Ness monster.”48  The ex ante Nozickian rights-
based approach provides little justification for the mandatory purchase 
provision. 49   If takeovers enlarge the opportunities of the target 
shareholders, as they are considered offers rather than threats, 
mandatory purchase provisions cannot be justified.  Even from the 
perspective of the remaining target shareholders, mandatory purchase 
provisions may reduce contractual opportunities as the heavy burden of 
the provision on the acquirer could result in few takeovers ex ante.  Ex 
post, mandatory purchase provisions may be viewed as offers to 
particular offeree shareholders in the target because they can choose to 
either sell their shares to the acquirer at a premium or remain in the 
target and expect the improvement of the target by the acquirer.  
Mandatory purchase provisions, however, are certainly threats to the 
shareholders in the acquiring company.  If takeovers do not create third 
party effects of coercion on the remaining shareholders in the target, it is 
                                                 
46 Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD 447, 447-453 (Sindey 
Morgenbesser et al. eds, 1969). 
47 See Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, Defensive Stock Repurchases, 99 HARV. L. 
REV. 1377 (1986); Louis Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers:  A Proposal for 
Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1983). 
48 John C. Coffee, Jr., The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform:  An Essay on Stockholders, 
Stateholders and Bust-Ups, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 435, 459. 
49 See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing Robert Nozick’s rights-based 
philosophy). 
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not clear why the contractual relation between the acquirer and part of 
the shareholders in the target should be restrained.   
Autonomy value—the concept that allowing an individual to freely 
determine his own affairs is fundamental and paramount to the moral 
enterprise—provides little support for mandatory purchase provisions.50  
Likewise, welfare value—the assessment of contractual relationships to 
determine whether a contractual arrangement would enhance or reduce 
the economic well-being of the contractual parties or third parties to 
determine whether government intervention is necessary—would also 
oppose the use of the mandatory purchase provision. 51   Mandatory 
purchase provisions increase the cost of acquiring the control of target 
companies.  The harmful effects of the mandatory purchase provision are 
obvious.  In the first place, mandatory purchase provisions reduce the 
number of offers by making targets more expensive to acquire.  
According to the economic law of supply and demand, the higher the 
price, the lower the demand from purchasers.  Lower demand in the 
context of takeovers means fewer takeovers, hence, possibly a smaller 
pie for society.  Second, the philosophy of sharing the gains from 
takeover transactions contained in the mandatory purchase provision 
reduces the return of investment on the part of the acquirer.  The 
inability of acquirers to appropriate the full value of their investments 
will lead them to undertake too few takeovers. 
This is the classic public good problem.52  The proper management 
of an inefficient target company is a public good to all the shareholders 
of the target.  It has also been pointed out “that there are significant costs 
in ensuring that directors/managers act in the interest of the 
[shareholders].  If one shareholder [acquirer] devotes resources to 
improving management, then all shareholders benefit.” 53   The 
mandatory purchase provision exacerbates the problem that the costs 
will be borne by third parties, or externalities, by allowing even the 
remaining shareholders of the target company to equally share takeover 
                                                 
50 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, in The THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 
223-40 (Peter Benson ed. 2001); MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF 
CONTRACT 241-68 (1993). 
51 TREBILCOCK, supra note 50, at 241-68. 
52 See Paul Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 386 
(1954) (discussing the nature of public goods). 
53 Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of 
the Corporation, 11 BELL J. ECON. 42, 59 (1980); see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. 
Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L. J. 698, 705-706 (1982) (providing a similar 
discussion of the problem of freeriders and externality in the context of freezeouts). 
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gains.  This severe externality problem indicates that it cannot be 
assumed that a company that is not being run in the interests of 
shareholders will always be vulnerable to a takeover bid.  An antidote to 
this externality problem is to exclude the remaining shareholders in the 
target from sharing equal gains resulting from takeovers ex post, hence, 
an argument for abolishing the mandatory purchase provision at least at 
the low threshold of holding thirty percent of outstanding common 
shares. 
C. Chinese Stock Exchange 
To understand how the imported takeover law adjusts to China’s 
local conditions, we need to understand the ownership structure of the 
listed companies on the two stock exchanges.  As discussed previously, 
both the development of China’s corporate law and the establishment of 
the stock market at the beginning of the 1990s were closely related to the 
reform of SOEs.54  A survey taken in May of 1999 revealed that among 
the 862 listed companies on the two stock exchanges, State-shares existed 
in 541, or 62.76% of the companies.55  Among the 541 listed companies, 
State-shares accounted for 45% of the total issued shares in these 
companies.56  In 473 listed companies, the State shareholder had either 
absolute or relative control of the company, occupying 87.43% of the 541 
listed companies.57  The State-shares were mainly held by State Asset 
Administration Bureaus (“SAAB”), State investment companies, or the 
parent companies of the State-owned listed companies.58  In 70.79% of 
the 541 listed companies, State-shares ranged from thirty to eighty 
percent. 59   Different from the shares held by individuals, which are 
traded at the two stock exchanges, State-shares and legal-person-shares 
of SOEs are not traded on the stock exchanges.  Another statistic shows 
                                                 
54 See supra notes 16-27 and accompanying text (discussing the development and reform 
of the Chinese stock market). 
55 Zhang Zongxin & Sun Yewei, The Optimization of Shareholding Structure and the 
Improvement of Corporate Governance in Listed Companies, 1 ECON. REV. 36 (2001). 
56 Id. 
57 Absolute control means that the State controls more than fifty percent of the issued 
shares, and relative control means that the State controls more than thirty percent of the 
issued shares.  Infobank, available at http://www.chinainfobank.com (last visited Oct. 28, 
2004); Zhang & Sun, supra note 55. 
58 Zhang & Sun, supra note 55, at 36.  The percentage of State ownership is much higher 
because State ownership may be held by legal persons of State-owned companies.  Id. 
59 Id. 
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that traded shares owned by individual investors in most listed 
companies are only between twenty-five to forty percent.60  
The structure of shareholding in most listed companies makes it 
impossible for an acquiring company to accumulate control through 
buying shares on any stock exchange.  So far, there has been no 
successful acquisition of control of a listed company by purchasing 
shares on the stock market.  To acquire a sufficient percentage of shares 
in a target listed company, instead, requires the purchase of part of the 
non-traded shares owned by the State or other companies.  This makes 
the negotiated takeover the preferred method of takeovers in China.  
Under this method, an acquiring company negotiates with a majority or 
block shareholder and enters into a share transfer agreement with that 
shareholder in the target listed company.  
D. Negotiated Takeovers 
Negotiated takeovers in China, however, have to overcome some 
procedural and legal hurdles.  On the procedural side, acquiring State-
owned shares or legal person shares of SOEs requires approval by the 
relevant authority.  Article 29 of the Provisional Measures on the 
Administration of State-Owned Shares of Joint Stock Companies 
provides that the transfer of State-owned shares needs the approval of 
the SAAB and the provincial government.61  Transferring more than 
thirty percent of the State-owned shares in a listed company requires the 
joint approval of the SAAB and the State Economic Restructuring 
Commission.62  The approval procedure is consistent with the goal of 
maintaining governmental control of large SOEs on the stock market. 
In addition to overcoming this procedural hurdle, negotiated 
takeovers must comply with the requirement of the mandatory purchase 
provision, which is central to the London City Code.  The cost of 
following such a mandatory purchase provision is well recognized by 
regulators in China.63  The practice of dealing with negotiated takeovers 
and the adjustment of English-style takeover law to the Chinese takeover 
                                                 
60 Zhang Rui, A Legal Analysis of Negotiated Takeovers of Listed Companies, JILIN UNIV. J. 
SOC. SCIENCES 108, 109 (July 2003). 
61 These administrative rules were jointly issued by the SAAB and the State Economic 
Restructuring Commission on November 3, 1994.  Infobank, available at http://www.china 
infobank.com (last visited Oct. 28, 2004). 
62 Id. 
63 Zhang Xin, Legislation and Regulation of Takeovers of Listed Companies, SEC. MARKET 
HERALD, August 2003, at 12. 
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market reflects the concern that strictly following the mandatory 
purchase provision is inefficient. 
The first negotiated takeover took place in 1994, under the early 
takeover regime. 64   Hengtong Investment, Ltd. (“Hengtong”) was 
incorporated in Zuhai in 1981.  Focusing on real estate development, 
Hengtong also developed in areas of shipping, communications, textiles, 
and electronic products.  To market its electricity meters in Shanghai, 
Hengtong planned to acquire a property development company in 
Shanghai.  Search efforts revealed that Shanghai Lingguang, Ltd. 
(“Lingguang”), which produced glass and electronic components, was a 
suitable target.  Lingguang issued 33.8 million shares total.  Among all 
the issued shares, Shanghai Construction, Ltd. held 55.26% of the shares 
on behalf of the State, while individual investors and legal person 
investors accounted for 32.55% and 11.89% of the shares, respectively.  
Shortly before the transfer of control, shares of Lingguang were trading 
at around thirteen yuan per share on the secondary market. Hengtong’s 
motivations of acquiring a controlling block of Lingguang shares were 
twofold.  First, Hengtong was motivated mainly to rely on Shanghai 
Construction’s connection with the property market in Shanghai.  
Secondly, the motivation was partly to take advantage of Lingguang’s 
technology.  The deal was encouraging news to Lingguang and Shanghai 
Construction based on the information then available, as Lingguang was 
short of funds to carry out ambitious development projects.  An 
agreement was reached among Hengtong, Shanghai Construction, and 
Lingguang to transfer 35.5% of the shares held by Shanghai Construction 
to Hengtong at the price of 4.3 yuan per share on April 28, 1994.  
Transferring more than thirty percent of the shares of a target, however, 
triggered the mandatory purchase provision.  To avoid the high cost of 
mandatorily purchasing the remaining shares of Lingguang, Hengtong 
applied to the CSRC for an exemption from the mandatory purchase 
requirement.  The CSRC granted an exemption, mainly on the ground 
that the transferred shares were the non-trading, State-owned shares. 
The Hengtong case raises a number of questions.  Could the CSRC 
approve the transfer price of 4.3 yuan per share when the individual 
shares traded on the secondary stock market were around thirteen yuan 
per share?  Is the significant discount of control shareholding able to 
ensure that the productive resources of the target would move towards a 
more efficient purchaser?  Another question is by which legal grounds 
                                                 
64 CHEN GONG ET AL., EDS, PRINCIPLES AND CASES OF CORPORATE MERGERS AND 
TAKEOVERS 421-425 ( Renmin Univ. Press, 1996). 
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did the CSRC give the exemption from the mandatory purchase 
obligation, because the ITS contains no legal provision conferring 
discretion upon the CSRC to grant exemptions.  The lack of a legal 
provision, of course, did not constrain the CSRC when the rule of law 
granting exemptions was not deeply entrenched in China.  Finally, 
should China follow the U.S. approach by exempting the transfer of 
control through an agreement under the need of protection test if it is 
well recognized that the cost of following the English mandatory 
purchase provision is too high?65  
E. Developments in Takeover Law 
Later development of the takeover law partially addressed the issues 
arising from Hengtong.  The Securities Law66 modified the mandatory 
purchase provision and deliberately gave the CSRC the discretion to 
exempt acquirers from following the mandatory purchase requirement if 
they acquired shares through any stock exchange. 67   The modified 
mandatory purchase provision now provides that if an investor holds 
thirty percent of the issued shares of a listed company and continues to 
buy such shares through a stock exchange, the investor shall make a 
takeover offer to all the shareholders of the listed target company.68  The 
Securities Law seems to make a difference with respect to negotiated 
takeovers.  Article 89 of the Securities Law stipulates: 
In the case of takeover by agreement, the [acquirer] may 
effect the equity transfer by entering into an agreement 
with the shareholders of the target company, as 
prescribed in laws and administrative regulations.  
When a listed company is taken over by agreement, the 
[acquirer] must, within three days after the agreement is 
reached, submit a written report on the takeover 
agreement to the State Council’s securities regulatory 
authority and the stock exchange, and make an 
announcement.69 
                                                 
65 Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1985). 
66 See Securities Laws, CHINA L. & PRAC., at 25 (February 1994) (providing an English 
translation of the law promulgated on Dec. 29, 1998, that became effective on July 1, 1999) 
[hereinafter Securities Laws]. 
67 Id. at 42 (art. 81). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 43-44 (art. 89). 
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Article 89 appears to be based on the need of protection test found in 
U.S. securities regulation, which is based on the theory that selling shares 
by sophisticated investors does not need the protection of the law.70  It is 
relatively clear that Article 89 does not expressly compel the acquirer to 
make an offer to all the shareholders in a negotiated takeover.  Nor does 
Article 89 require the acquirer to obtain approval from the CSRC for 
such a negotiated takeover, except for the compliance with the reporting 
and announcement requirement.  Article 89 seems to recognize the high 
cost of the mandatory purchase provision and the need of a corporate 
control market to improve the inefficient State-owned listed companies.  
However, Article 89 has not been used in that way.  The CSRC’s position 
is that, whatever the method of acquiring control, the mandatory 
purchase provision must be complied with unless it has granted the 
acquirer a waiver.  This position is consistent with the practice of 
negotiated takeovers in China:  By the end of 2000, 121 negotiated 
takeovers had followed the pattern of Hengtong by obtaining a waiver 
from the CSRC.71 
F. Negotiated Takeovers Reconsidered 
As discussed previously, most of China’s SOEs on the stock market 
are not very efficient.  A study has found that there is a negative 
correlation between firm performance and the percentage of State-
owned shares. 72   Empirical evidence in another study suggests that 
takeovers in China are largely efficient compared with the status of 
many companies before the takeover, although the market could be more 
efficient if ideological issues are dealt with properly.73 
The inefficiency of the State-owned listed companies and the need of 
an active takeover market to facilitate the reallocation of productive 
resources requires China to modify the English-style takeover law in the 
Chinese takeover environment.  This objective has led the CSRC to 
reconsider its position on negotiated takeovers.  In 2002, the CSRC issued 
the Procedures on the Administration of the Takeover of Listed 
                                                 
70 Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1978); see 
Hanson Trust PLC, 774 F. 2d 47. 
71 Li Bingan, A Discussion of the Exemption from the Mandatory Purchase Provision, 18(6) 
LEGAL F. 50 (Nov. 2003). 
72 He Xiaogang, Management Buyouts:  The Status Abroad, Research, and Development in 
China, 4 REFORM 54 (2003). 
73 Fei Yiwen & Cai Mingchao, An Analysis of the Takeover Effects of Listed Companies on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange, 5 WORLD ECON. 64 (2003). 
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Companies (“Takeover Procedures”). 74   The Takeover Procedures 
reaffirm the position of the CSRC that, whatever the method of acquiring 
more than thirty percent of the shares in a target listed company, the 
mandatory purchase requirement must be complied with unless 
exemption from the CSRC is obtained. 75   However, the Takeover 
Procedures have also provided numerous grounds upon which the 
CSRC is prepared to grant a waiver.  
Some of the waiver exceptions are related to debt restructuring and 
insolvency reorganization.  For instance, a waiver will be given if the 
transfer of shares is applied for on the basis of a court ruling and results 
in the percentage of shares held or controlled by the purchaser exceeding 
thirty percent of the listed company’s issued shares.76  A waiver will also 
be provided if a bank, during the ordinary course of business, has 
acquired more than thirty percent of the issued shares of a listed 
company, even though the bank has no intention or has taken no action 
to actually control such a listed company, and has made arrangements to 
transfer the excess shares to non-affiliated parties. 77   An insolvency 
waiver is provided to an acquirer that is taking over a listed company in 
financial distress in order to rescue it under a proposed and feasible 
restructuring plan.78  
Other waiver exceptions are based on the ground that no 
shareholder in a target listed company has received a takeover premium, 
such as when an acquirer accumulates more than thirty percent of the 
shares of a listed company resulting from the company’s issuing new 
shares.79  Another waiver exception is allowed where the acquisition of 
more than thirty percent of the issued shares of a listed company is 
caused by the reduction of the capital of the company.80  
In the past, the CSRC frequently gave waivers if the administrative 
transfer of State-owned shares had caused the transferee to hold or 
control more than thirty percent of the issued shares of a listed 
company. 81   This exemption remains under the new Takeover 
Procedures.  Finally, the Takeover Procedures have added a catchall 
                                                 
74 Administration, supra note 33, at 43. 
75 Id. at 45-46 (arts. 13-14, 23). 
76 Id. at 56 (art. 49(4)). 
77 Id. (art. 51(4)). 
78 Id. at 55 (art. 49(2)). 
79 Id. (art. 49(3)). 
80 Id. at 56 (art. 51(2)). 
81 Id. at 57 (art. 51(5)). 
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provision, giving the CSRC the discretion to waive the mandatory 
purchase provision if the CSRC considers it necessary to meet the needs 
of the development and changes of the securities market and the need to 
protect the legitimate rights and interests of investors.82  The transfer of 
control through administrative means as practiced in the past has made 
the mandatory purchase provision largely irrelevant. If the catch-all 
provision is also liberally used, the mandatory purchase provision will 
also be made partly irrelevant.  
The discussion of the adjustment of the English-style mandatory 
purchase provision clearly shows that application of the provision in 
China is path-dependent.  The political goal of maintaining control of the 
State-owned listed companies has completely changed the rationale of 
using such a provision.  The past socialist system of public ownership of 
the means of production created interested parties that controlled both 
the political and economic resources.  These interested parties will try to 
protect their vested rights and interests.  An easier way of continuing 
their control is to maintain the control of the large State-owned listed 
companies.  The insistence of this political goal requires a different way 
of using the law of takeovers.  China’s developing securities market can 
be properly understood only in the context of its underlying motivation, 
by carefully avoiding the mistake of assuming that adoption of western-
style structures and laws implies movement toward western goals.83 
If we take the ex ante efficiency view discussed previously, the 
adjustment of the imported takeover law is very positive in the sense of 
achieving the primary goal of improving the large number of 
inefficiently run State-owned listed companies.  Another positive use of 
English-style takeover law is the adoption of non-frustration on the part 
of the directors in a target listed company when facing a takeover offer.84  
Article 33 of the Takeover Procedures provides that the decisions made 
and measures taken by the directors, supervisors and senior 
management of the target company with respect to the takeover offer 
made by an acquirer may not prejudice the legitimate rights and 
interests of the company or its shareholders.85  More specifically, Article 
33 prohibits the adoption of measures of issuing new shares or 
                                                 
82 Id. at 56-57 (arts. 49(5), 51(7)). 
83 Art & Gu, supra note 27. 
84 London City Code, available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk (last visited Oct. 
28, 2004) (General Principle 7). 
85 Takeover Procedures, CHINA L. & PRAC. 51-52 (Nov. 2002) (art. 33) [hereinafter Takeover 
Procedures]. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 2 [2004], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol39/iss2/3
2004] China's State-Owned Enterprises 355 
 
convertible bonds, the repurchase of its own shares, the amendment of 
articles of association, and the signing of contracts, which could have a 
major effect on the company’s assets, liabilities, rights, interests, or 
business outcomes, except in the ordinary course of business, after an 
acquirer has announced its takeover intention.86 
G. U.S. Takeover Practice 
In the United States, controversy surrounds whether the board of 
directors or the shareholders should be given the ultimate power to 
decide whether the corporation should be sold to a bidder that offers to 
buy all the corporation’s shares at a substantial premium above the 
current stock market price.  Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor 
Daniel Fischel argue that management should remain completely passive 
in the face of a takeover bid. 87   Their argument is based on the 
assumption that most takeovers are efficient in that they discipline 
inefficient managers in the target. 88   When inefficient managers are 
facing a takeover bid that tends to remove them, it is unlikely that their 
action to defeat the takeover will be for the best interest of the target 
corporation.89  Professor Lucian Bebchuk argues that, once mechanisms 
to ensure undistorted shareholder choice are in place, boards should not 
be permitted to block offers beyond the period necessary for putting 
together alternatives for shareholder consideration.90  In contrast, Martin 
Lipton argues against a regime of shareholders voting and no board 
veto.91  According to Lipton, there are significant costs to corporations in 
being managed as if they were constantly for sale.92 
The Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) takes a middle 
ground.  The DGCL gives the board of directors a central role in 
                                                 
86 Id. 
87 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management 
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981). 
88 Id. 
89 See Alan Schwartz, The Fairness of Tender Offer Prices in Utilitarian Theory, 17 J. L. STUD. 
165 (1988) (providing a similar view as Easterbrook and Fischel). Inefficient managers in 
the target company can be disciplined when the acquiring company has taken over the 
target and replaced the inefficient managers with efficient and responsible managers. In 
other words, the inefficient managers can be disciplined by the loss of their jobs after a 
takeover. 
90 Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 973 (2002). 
91 Martin Lipton, Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037 (2002). 
92 Id. at 1061-1062. 
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corporate decision-making,93 but it also requires stockholder consent for 
many fundamental transactions.94  The DGCL is, however, silent on the 
most contentious question in the debate:  In what circumstances, and to 
what extent, are directors empowered to prevent shareholders from 
accepting a tender offer?  The Delaware courts also takes a middle 
ground.  While in principle Delaware case law holds that the purpose of 
the corporation is to maximize the wealth of its stockholders,95 Delaware 
decisions also give directors substantial authority to deploy the powerful 
weapon of a poison pill,96 and to block takeover offers that appear to be 
in the best interests of the current array of stockholders.97  The Delaware 
courts, however, have subjected defensive measures to a heightened 
form of judicial review under which directors must prove the 
reasonableness and good faith of their actions.98  The result is a regime in 
which directors are given substantial authority to forge corporate 
strategies while leaving room for stockholders to vote down 
management-preferred directors and to use the election process to avail 
themselves of a tender offer.99 
The adoption of the English-style mandatory purchase provision at 
the beginning of 1990s has educated regulators in China relatively well 
on other parts of the London City Code.  When the CSRC issued the 
Takeover Procedures in 2002, it again chose the English position of non-
frustration over the Delaware-type of takeover law on the proper role of 
the target board when the target is facing a takeover offer.100  The choice 
for the English-style purchase provision is largely satisfactory in the 
context of China for at least two reasons.  First, Delaware law is very 
complicated.  At this stage, regulators and judges in China are still not 
sophisticated in takeover law.  To expect them to administer the 
Delaware-type of takeover law when even the judges in other parts of 
the United States are not able to do so is likely to be counterproductive.  
Second, directors in the United States are subject to greater constraints by 
                                                 
93 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2001). 
94 See, e.g., id. § 251 (referring to mergers); Id. § 271 (referring to the sale of substantially 
all the assets of the firm). 
95 See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993). 
96 See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1390 (Del. 1995). 
97 See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 
1990). 
98 See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985). 
99 See generally William Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate:  A Meditation on Bridging 
the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067 (2002) (discussing the theoretical debate on 
takeovers in the United States and the current status of Delaware law on takeovers). 
100 See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
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very strict fiduciary duties, derivative suits, and various market 
mechanisms that are not available in China.101 
H. Negotiated Takeover Defects 
While the adoption of English-style takeover law and the adjustment 
of the law in China are headed in the right direction, negotiated takeover 
transactions have a serious defect.  As discussed previously, only shares 
held by individuals in listed companies are traded on the two stock 
exchanges, while State-shares and legal person shares of SOEs are not 
traded on the stock exchanges.  This raises the issue of pricing the control 
block of State-owned shares.  In the Hengtong case, the control block was 
priced at 4.3 yuan per share when the shares traded on the stock 
exchange were around thirteen yuan per share. 102   The Opinions 
Concerning the Exercise of State-Owned Shares in Joint Stock 
Companies 103  dictates that the lowest transfer price of State-owned 
shares is the net asset value per share.104  In Hengtong and all the other 
cases before 2004 when the control block of State-owned shares was 
transferred, the price of the shares of the block was several times lower 
than the price of the shares traded on the stock market.105  In a few cases, 
even the requirement of the lowest transfer price of net asset value per 
share is not followed.106   
The practice of negotiated takeovers in China also indicates why the 
mandatory purchase provision, which is central to the London City 
Code, is not followed in China.  The mandatory purchase provision is 
based on the premise that the acquirer has to extend the same premium 
to all other shareholders if he buys shares at a price higher than the 
market price from either the majority, block, or some shareholders, that 
are more likely to get the benefits because of their positions.  This 
ensures equality of treatment for all shareholders in the target.  In China, 
when the control block is priced at a much lower price than the market 
price of other shares traded on the stock market, the mandatory 
                                                 
101 See Zhang Xin, supra note 63 at 15-17 (illustrating the regulator’s view). 
102 CHEN GONG ET. AL, supra note 64. 
103 The Opinions Concerning Exercise of State-Owned Shares in Joint Stock Companies, (Aug. 
29, 1997) available at http://www.chinainfobank.com/IrisBin/Text.d11?db=FL&no 
=11092&cs=102 (providing opinions jointly issued by the SAAB and the State Economic 
Restructuring Commission). 
104 Id. (Art. 17). 
105 CHEN GONG ET AL., supra note 64. 
106 An Chunmei & Dou Zhanguo, An Analysis of Benefits and Risks of Management Buyouts 
in Listed Companies, 7 FIN. AND ACCT. RES. 52 (2002); Wang Huacheng & Tong Yan, 
Management Buyouts in China:  The Case of Media, 10 ECON. THEORY AND MGMT. 66 (2002). 
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purchase provision loses its rationale.  Obviously, the CSRC and the 
government are more interested in the facilitation of the reallocation of 
the productive resources of State-owned listed companies, and the 
interest of minority shareholders is to a large extent ignored.  This again 
leads to the conclusion that the political goal of maintaining the control 
of State-owned listed companies has made the imported law 
considerably irrelevant.  While not following the mandatory purchase 
provision can be justified on efficiency grounds, the cheap transfer of 
control blocks in China has left minority shareholders with no adequate 
protection.  
In the United States and the United Kingdom, the concern of 
takeover law is to ensure minority shareholders a premium over the 
market price.  Because of the benefits of control, the price of the control 
block is normally higher than the price of the shares of a target on the 
secondary market.  The higher price of the control block is a basic market 
mechanism to protect the minority shareholders in that, given the 
constraints, only those who are able to manage the target better can 
obtain control.  There may be mistakes in prediction or judgment on the 
part of the acquirer, and the effect of takeover may be disastrous.  Yet, 
the market in the long run will correct the mistakes.  The cheap transfer 
of control in China, however, is not able to ensure that acquirers are 
necessarily better than the existing management in targets.  Furthermore, 
the discount of the share price of the control block creates serious risks of 
exploiting minority shareholders.  In January 2004, the SAAB and the 
Ministry of Finance jointly issued the Provisional Measures on the 
Administration of the Transfer of State-Owned Shares (“Provisional 
Measures”). 107   The Provisional Measures now permit, but do not 
compel, the use of auctions or biddings in takeovers in addition to 
negotiated takeovers.108  Similar to other administrative rules, however, 
the Provisional Measures are more interested in ensuring that the State-
owned assets are not depleted in the low price transfer of control to 
private enterprises rather than liberalizing the control of SOEs.  
While auctions and biddings in takeovers will alleviate the problem 
of cheap transfer of control of listed companies in China, the move 
towards an efficient takeover market requires a radical reform of the 
large-scale exit of SOEs in many sectors of the economy.  SOEs are 
unlikely to be efficient as there are no adequate means to motivate the 
agents in SOEs or to discipline such agents compared with the means 
                                                 
107 Provisional Measures, (Aug. 23, 2004), available at http://www.chinainfobank.com. 
108 Id. 
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available to private firms.109  If a government is not pursuing the political 
goal of maintaining the control of the large listed companies, it is better 
to have a competitive takeover market where even private companies are 
able to join the competition of acquiring control of some large State-
owned listed companies.  The involvement of private companies would 
significantly increase opportunities for takeovers of inefficiently run 
State-owned listed companies.   
The recent case of bidding for control of the Harbin Brewery by two 
foreign transnational companies on China’s takeover market provides a 
very good example.110  In that case, not only was the price of the takeover 
fifty times the earnings of the Harbin Brewery in 2003, but the competing 
bidders were making a takeover bid for one hundred percent of the 
shares in the target company.  It must be acknowledged that this is a 
very exceptional case.  Only when the government is seriously thinking 
of exiting from most listed companies will the regulators pay close 
attention to the protection of rights and interests of minority 
shareholders in listed companies in China.  To realize the goal of 
achieving efficiency through corporate law in general and takeover law 
in particular, the Chinese Government must abandon the concept of 
controlling the State-owned listed companies for the purpose of political 
control.  Only then can the law of takeover fully realize its efficiency 
goal.  Currently, the use of an English-type takeover law does not 
achieve the goal of improving the inefficiency of SOEs. 
III.  WEAK ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW ON SECURITIES FRAUD 
In a market economy, private companies compete for scarce financial 
resources.  They obtain capital through retained earnings, new equity, or 
debt investment from the capital markets.  In a relatively efficient capital 
market, the cost of capital formation is lower for good companies than 
for bad companies.  Competitive discipline requires a company not to 
waste resources; if it wastes, retained earnings will disappear and new 
investment will not be forthcoming.  An efficient capital market not only 
requires the law to deal with abuse, but also the threat of using the law 
must be credible. 
In contrast, public enterprises do not face “hard” budget 
constraints.111  Rather, governments have access to capital through their 
                                                 
109 See Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 9. 
110 The Beers Are on Anheuser, THE ECONOMIST, June 5-11, 2004, at 56. 
111 See generally KORNAI, supra note 23 (discussing soft budget constraints). 
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taxation powers and may use those monies to fund operations, even if 
those operations would not survive in the private setting.112  It has been 
pointed out that the risk of using the taxation powers is present when 
governments supply goods and services directly or through the vehicle 
of SOEs.113  The lack of discipline on SOEs in the capital market is 
another reason that SOEs are far less motivated and efficient than private 
companies. 
As discussed in Part II, China’s stock market was mainly designed at 
the beginning of the 1990s to solve the inefficiency of SOEs, which is why 
the State-owned listed companies dominate the two stock exchanges. 114  
This section will explain that the privilege China’s SOEs enjoyed in using 
the stock market is another form of soft budget constraints.  So long as 
SOEs do not have to compete with other private or foreign companies for 
capital on the stock market, it is unlikely that they will have the same 
motivation to maximize profits.  When the stock market is also used 
politically by the government to maintain control of large SOEs in many 
sectors of the economy, it is unlikely that a Western-type of securities 
regulation will be strictly enforced.  Therefore, this section will also 
explain that if a public framework of accountability cannot be developed 
to deal with abuses in public companies, it is doubtful whether such a 
system can be developed in a cost effective way to curb abuses in private 
companies on the market.  
A. Cases of Securities Fraud 
1. Chengdu Hong Guang Industrial, Ltd. (“Hong Guang”) 
In 1996, Hong Guang applied to the CSRC to list its shares. 115  
Despite the fact that the company suffered a loss of Rmb 103 million 
yuan, the company claimed that it had a profit of Rmb 54 million yuan.  
The company also falsified profit records in 1997 and 1998 after its shares 
were listed.  In addition to covering the huge losses it suffered, Hong 
Guang used 34.3% of the capital raised in listing its shares (Rmb 140 
million) to buy and sell shares on the stock market by itself and through 
a securities company.  Because speculative trading by SOEs and listed 
                                                 
112 See Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 9, at 1429. 
113 William Megginson & Jeffry Netter, From State to Market:  A Survey of Empirical Studies 
on Privatization, 39 J. ECON. LIT. 321, 331 (2001). 
114 See supra Part II. 
115 Penalty Decision Regarding the Violation of Securities Regulation by Chengdo Hong Guang 
Industrial Ltd., CHINA SECURITIES REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICIAL BULLETIN 51 (Oct. 26, 
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companies was prohibited, 116  the speculative trading of shares was 
carried out through the opening of 228 individual trading accounts.  As a 
matter of fact, Hong Gunag only used 16.5% of the capital raised for the 
projects described in its prospectus.  Most of the capital raised was 
actually used by the company to pay its debts to banks both at home and 
abroad.  After investigation, the CSRC confiscated Rmb 4.5 million yuan 
in illegal trading profits derived from speculative trading, imposed an 
administrative fine of Rmb one million yuan, and permanently 
prohibited the chairman of the board of directors, the general manager, 
and the deputy financial officer from assuming senior officer positions in 
listed companies or securities institutions.  Subsequently, the 
Intermediate People’s Court of Chengdu sentenced these three people to 
jail terms of three years or less.117  While this was the first case that 
criminal liability was imposed on responsible persons in listed 
companies, the court refused to hold a trial for the claim of civil liability.  
Even though the fraud would be a clear case of the tort of deceit in well 
developed common law jurisdictions, and civil liability can also be 
grounded on Article 77 of the Provisional Regulation on the 
Administration of Issuing and Trading of Shares118 and Article 63 of the 
Securities Law,119 the Court justified its decision on the ground that the 
loss suffered by investors was not necessarily caused by the fraud.120   
2. Energy 28  
Energy 28 falsely claimed to have a profit of Rmb sixteen million 
yuan at the time of application for listing its shares and a total profit of 
Rmb 211 million yuan during the three years thereafter.121  Furthermore, 
the company changed the use of funds as specified in the prospectus in 
                                                 
116 Measures Concerning the Prohibition of Speculative Trading of Shares by State-Owned 
Enterprises and Listing Companies, COLLECTION OF THE LAWS OF THE PRC 498 (1997) (issuing 
jointly by the State Council Securities Commission, the People’s Bank of China, and the 
State Economic and Trade Commission on May 27, 1997). 
117 Yao Bei, Hong Guang:  The First Case of Criminal Punishment, PEOPLE NET, (Dec. 15, 
2000), available at http://www.people.com.cn. 
118 COLLECTION OF THE LAWS OF THE PRC 480 (1993) (promulgated by the State Council on 
April 22, 1993), translated in Securities Regulations, CHINA L. & PRAC. 23 (1993) [hereinafter 
Securities Regulations]. 
119 COLLECTION OF THE LAWS OF THE PRC 671 (1998) (enacted by the Standing Committee 
of the National People’s Congress on Dec. 29, 1998), translated in Securities Law, CHINA L. & 
PRAC. 25 (February 1999). 
120 Yao, supra note 117.  It is not clear whether criminal liability would have been 
imposed had the responsible persons not used the raised money for speculative trading (a 
purely personal act compared with the raising of funds for the company). 
121 Luo Xiaoming, CSRC Investigated and Punished Energy 28, PEOPLE NET (Dec. 20, 2000), 
available at http://www.people.com.cn. 
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1996 and in the documents for an additional issue of shares in 1997.  As a 
result, the CSRC imposed an administrative fine of Rmb one million 
yuan on the company, Rmb fifty thousand yuan upon the chairman of 
the board of directors, and Rmb thirty thousand yuan upon three other 
directors.  There were neither criminal proceedings nor civil lawsuits 
instituted in this case. 
3. Sanjiu Medical and Pharmaceutical Co. (“Sanjiu”) 
During an investigation conducted by the CSRC in June 2001, the 
CSRC discovered that the controlling shareholder of Sanjiu improperly 
used a total of Rmb 2.5 billion yuan of Sanjiu funds, accounting for 
ninety-six percent of Sanjiu’s net assets.122  The board of directors and the 
supervisory board of Sanjiu did not support the use of such a large 
amount of the listing company’s funds by the controlling shareholder for 
a connected transaction.  Except for a public criticism by the CSRC, 
however, no shareholders’ action was taken against the controlling 
shareholder in this case.  Lack of clear provisions on derivative actions 
by shareholders makes it very difficult for individual shareholders to sue 
the wrongdoers that violate provisions either in the Company Law or in 
the Articles of Association of Listed Companies.123   
4. Hubei Meierya Co. (“Meierya”) 
Improper use of funds by listed companies also occurred in 
Meierya.124  In that case, the controlling shareholder improperly used 
Rmb 368 million yuan belonging to Meierya, accounting for forty-one 
percent of Meierya’s net assets. It does not appear from the report that 
either the board of directors or the shareholders of Meierya authorized 
the use of funds. 
5. Shanghai Jiabao Industrial (Group) Co. (“Jiabao”) 
The CSRC investigated Jiabao in August 2000.  Among other 
violations of law uncovered by the CSRC, Jiabao engaged in illegal 
                                                 
122 Public Criticisms by the CSRC on Three and Nine Medical and Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. and 
the Relevant Persons, (Aug. 21, 2001), available at http://www.chinainfobank.com. 
123 COLLECTIONS OF THE LAWS OF THE PRC 779 (1998) (issuing the Guidelines of Articles of 
Association of Listed Companies by the China Securities Regulatory Commission on Dec. 
16, 1997). 
124 Public Criticisms by China Securities Regulatory Commission on Hubei Meierya Co. Ltd. and 
the Relevant Persons of the Company, (September 20, 2001), available at http://www.chinainfo 
bank.com. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 2 [2004], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol39/iss2/3
2004] China's State-Owned Enterprises 363 
 
speculative trading of shares in other companies.125  The investigation 
revealed that Jiabao injected Rmb 228 million yuan onto both the 
primary market and the secondary market in Shanghai.  As listed 
companies are prohibited from speculative trading, Jiabao utilized more 
than three hundred individual accounts to circumvent the ban from 1996 
to 1998. 126  The illegal gain from the trading of shares in other companies 
amounted to Rmb 840,000 yuan.  Besides illegal trading of shares in 
other companies, Jiabao also traded the shares of its own company by 
using three accounts of different individuals.  The investigation did not 
discover any illegal gain from the trading of its own shares.  In that case, 
the CSRC imposed an administrative fine of Rmb fifty thousand yuan 
upon the chairman of the board of directors, confiscated the illegal 
trading gain of Rmb 840,000 yuan, and publicly criticized the directors of 
Jiabao. 
6. Shandong Bohai Holding, Ltd. (“Bohai”) 
Bohai was a case of manipulation of the company’s own shares.127  
On August 1, 1994, senior officers of Bohai engaged in repeated trading 
and false purchases and sales of shares of its own company without the 
actual transfer of title of the shares.  Like the previous cases, the senior 
officers used the accounts in the name of four individuals.  The price of 
Bohai shares rose 102% as a result of the market manipulation.  Bohai 
spent Rmb 19.9 million yuan of its own funds purchasing 3,981,200 of its 
own shares on the Shanghai Stock Exchange.128  Bohai eventually sold all 
of these shares, and, together with 845,600 shares held before August 1, 
Bohai had made a profit of Rmb 5.9 million yuan. 129   The CSRC 
discovered numerous violations of the securities regulations by Bohai 
and issued an official reprimand, confiscated the illegal profits, and 
imposed a fine of Rmb one million yuan on the company and a fine of 
Rmb fifty thousand yuan on Mr. Li Gang, the responsible officer.130 
                                                 
125 Penalty Decision of China Securities Regulatory Commission Concerning the Violation of 
Securities Law and Regulation by Shanghai Jiabao Industrial (Group) Co. Ltd., CHINA SECURITIES 
REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICIAL BULLETIN 36 (Oct. 8, 2000), available at 
http://www.chinainfobank.com. 
126 See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
127 Philip Gregory, Securities Fraud in the PRC, CHINA L. & PRAC. 20, 21 (March 1995). 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
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B. Implications of the Cases 
These Chinese cases provide strong evidence that managers are not 
working for the best interest of the residual claimants.  In the case of 
Hong Guang, managers cheated investors out of their money at the time 
of listing by falsifying profit records.131  The strategy of using a false 
profit record was also adopted by Energy 28 for the subsequent 
distribution of shares after the company had become a listed company.132  
The controlling shareholders’ abuses of the listing companies’ funds in 
the cases of Sanjiu and Meierya shows a lack of consideration on the part 
of controlling shareholders for the interest of minority shareholders.133   
The Chinese way of vividly describing cheating of capital suppliers 
by the insiders, such as managers and controlling shareholders, is 
“quanqian,” or circling money.  Using funds raised for improper 
purposes on the stock market, such as in the case of Jiabao, provides 
evidence that managers do not have good projects to efficiently use the 
raised capital.134  Manipulating the shares of their own companies, in the 
cases of Jiabao and Bohai, indicates that managers in these companies are 
not using all their skills and efforts to discover net present value projects 
or using existing assets effectively.135   Such straightforward cases of 
cheating their own shareholders are very unlikely to occur in 
jurisdictions where minority shareholders are well protected. 
The Chinese government has tried to eliminate the problem of soft 
budget constraints by tightening the bank credit provided to SOEs.  This 
attempt has created problems for mismanaged SOEs.  The use of the 
stock market is expected to provide the necessary funds so that some 
symbolicly-large, State-owned listed companies can survive, while being 
subjected to some stock market disciplines.  From an agency perspective, 
when managers and directors in SOEs are not motivated to pursue the 
clear goal of maximizing profit and are not subject to hard budget 
constraints if their companies are efficiently run, they will seek personal 
gains, as demonstrated in the above cases.  The cases also reveal that the 
political goal of maintaining some symbolicly-large, listed SOEs requires 
the continuous supply of capital.  In the past, the problem was that State-
owned banks could not tighten the credit on inefficient SOEs, but the 
                                                 
131 See supra Part III.A.1. 
132 See supra Part III.A.2. 
133 See supra Part III.A.3. 
134 See supra Part III.A.4. 
135 See supra Part III.A.4-5. 
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current problem is that the government cannot tighten the supply of 
capital on the stock market.  If capital markets cannot penalize inefficient 
SOEs because of political concerns, it is unlikely that corporate law and 
securities regulations, including civil remedies, will be strictly enforced.   
C. Weak Enforcement of Securities Regulation 
Since the establishment of the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 1990 and 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1991, the stock market in China has 
developed relatively quickly.136  By the end of 2000, there had been 1,211 
corporations listed domestically and internationally. 137   In December 
2000, thirty percent of corporate capital was raised on the stock market 
as compared with ten percent in 1993.138  The capitalization of the stock 
market was fifty-seven percent of the gross domestic product,139 which is 
very puzzling considering the weak protection of minority shareholders.  
High savings rates and a lack of alternative investment channels explains 
why the stock market in China can develop quickly when investors are 
frequently cheated.  Measured by the factor of whether corporations 
assure a reasonable return to the suppliers of capital, the corporate 
governance system in China requires considerable improvements. 
The weak protection of minority shareholders is caused by several 
factors.  First, criminal prosecution is rarely instituted.  The Company 
Law140 and the Provisional Regulation on the Issuance and Trading of 
Shares (“PRITS”)141 do not contain clear provisions on criminal liability 
for misstatements in disclosure documents.  However, the Decision on the 
Punishment of Crimes in Violation of the Company Law142 provides that if a 
company issues shares or corporate bonds with a falsified prospectus, 
subscription forms, or corporate bond distribution documents, thereby 
                                                 
136 Han Zhiguo, The Development and Innovation of Shareholding Economy in China, PEOPLE 
NET, (May 26, 2001), available at http://www.peopledaily.com.cn. 
137 Wu Feng, Ten Questions Required Quick Solutions, PEOPLE NET, (September 22, 2001), 
available at http://www.peopledaily.com.cn. 
138 Fang Yuan, Zhou Xiaochuan:  The Securities Market Has a Big Opera Next Year, PEOPLE 
NET, (Dec. 29, 2000), available at http://www.people.com.cn. 
139 See Wu Feng, supra note 137. 
140 COLLECTION OF THE LAWS OF THE PRC 456 (1993) (effective July 1, 1994), translated in 
Company Law, CHINA L. & PRAC. 7, 20 (1994) (arts. 59, 51). 
141 COLLECTION OF THE LAWS OF THE PRC 480 (1993), translated in Securities Regulations, 
supra note 118, at 23 (presenting the PRITS, which was issued by the State Council on April 
22, 1993). 
142 COLLECTION OF THE LAWS OF THE PRC 51 (1994), available at http://isinolaw.com 
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National People’s Congress on February 28, 1995). 
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raising huge amount of capital and causing serious consequences or 
other serious events, the persons directly responsible will be sentenced 
either for a term of less than five years or subject to a criminal penalty of 
five percent of the amount raised, or the person will be subject to both 
penalties.143  A similar provision was subsequently incorporated into the 
1997 Criminal Act.144  Despite such a clear provision and numerous cases 
of misrepresentation, the first case where criminal liability was imposed 
on three directors did not occur until 2000.145  
Second, the civil liability regime is not only poorly framed but also 
weakly enforced.  Compared with the relatively clear provisions on 
criminal liability, there are only a few major provisions on civil liability.  
Article 77 of PRITS stipulates that “anyone who violat[es PRITS and] 
causes losses to others shall bear civil liability for compensation 
according to law.”146  Since four types of misconduct are regulated by 
PRITS, covering misrepresentation, insider trading, market 
manipulation, and fraud committed by securities intermediaries against 
customers, it is very difficult for judges who are not sophisticated and do 
not have law-making power to apply such a vague provision to deal 
with civil liabilities when capital users or intermediaries deliberately or 
negligently mislead investors through disclosure documents.147  Because 
of this difficulty in applying Article 77 of PRITS, it has not been used to 
hold any defendant civilly liable for misrepresentation.  Likewise, the 
Securities Law Article 63 provides the following: 
If the prospectus, documents of offer of corporate bonds, 
financial or accounting reports, listing documents, 
annual reports, mid-term reports or ad hoc reports 
distributed by the issuer or distributing securities 
company contain a falsehood, misleading statement or 
major omission and thereby causes investors to sustain 
losses in the course of securities trading, the issuer or 
distributing securities company shall be liable for 
damages and the responsible directors, supervisors 
and/or the managers of the issuer or distributing 
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145 See Penalty Decision Regarding the Violation of Securities Regulation by Chengdo Hong 
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securities company shall be jointly and severely liable 
for damages.148  
While Article 63 covers issuing companies and underwriters for both 
negligent and fraudulent statements in these relevant disclosure 
documents, Article 202 provides the grounds for civil liability in 
connection with fraudulent misstatements produced by 
intermediaries.149  Article 202 provides, among other things, that “if a 
professional organization that issues documents such as audit reports, 
asset valuation reports or legal opinions for the issuance of or listing of 
securities or securities trading activities” provides false certification and 
causes losses to investors, the professional organization shall bear 
liability.150  There are at least two problems with Article 202.  First, 
fraudulent misrepresentation is difficult to prove in practice.  A better 
approach is to hold intermediaries liable based on negligent 
misrepresentation.  Second, there is no need to always hold the 
intermediaries jointly liable—they can be independently liable for their 
own negligence, particularly when the issuer has no fault.   
Leaving aside the problems in Article 202, the civil liability for 
negligent misrepresentation provided in Article 63 is relatively clear.  By 
the end of 2002, however, there had not been a single case where an 
issuer bore civil liability despite the large number of cases of negligent or 
fraudulent misrepresentation.  In the Hong Guang case discussed 
previously, the First Intermediate People’s Court of Chengdu in the 
Province of Sichuan sentenced several directors to three-year 
imprisonments or other criminal penalties.151  Investors in that case also 
instituted civil actions, claiming damages for misrepresentation.152  The 
District People’s Court of Pudong, however, did not accept their cases, 
explaining that the cases did not fall within the scope of acceptance.153   
                                                 
148 COLLECTION OF THE LAWS OF THE PRC 671 (1997), translated in Securities Laws, supra 
note 66, at 37 (art. 63) (promulgated Dec. 29, 1998, effective July 1, 1999). 
149 Id. at 37 (art. 63), 64 (art. 202). 
150 Securities Laws, supra note 66,  at  64 (art. 202). 
151 See Penalty Decision Regarding the Violation of Securities Regulation by Chengdo Hong 
Guang Industrial Ltd., supra note 115. 
152 The first person to bring a lawsuit was Jiang.  Huang Xiangyuan, Hong Guang Qizha 
An Mei Namo Rongyi Wanjie (The Case of Fraud of Hong Guang Could Not Easily Be Ended), 
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Civil lawsuits were also instituted in several courts in the similar 
case of Yin Guang Xia.154  Whereas many courts refused to accept cases of 
misrepresentation, a court in Wuxi originally planned to entertain a 
similar lawsuit.155  Shortly after the Wuxi court accepted the case, the 
Supreme People’s Court instructed all courts not to accept civil cases 
related to securities fraud, insider trading, and market manipulation.156  
Upon receiving the Notice, the Wuxi Court suspended the treatment of 
the case.   
The Notice of the Supreme People’s Court invited a great deal of 
criticism.157  Four months later, the Supreme People’s Court circulated 
another notice to the lower courts, instructing them to accept civil suits 
related to misrepresentation in disclosure documents. 158   In this 
subsequent Notice, the Supreme People’s Court conditioned the 
acceptance of civil lawsuits upon investigation and punishment of the 
wrongdoer by the CSRC.159  Further, the Supreme People’s Court stated 
that no class action should be allowed. 160   Although the Supreme 
People’s Court subsequently issued a relatively detailed judicial opinion, 
as of May 2004, there had been no court judgment requiring an issuer 
with securities fraud to pay large sums of damages to a large number of 
small investors.161 
In addition to the weak enforcement of criminal and civil provisions, 
lack of shareholders’ remedies is another factor contributing to the weak 
corporate governance system in China.  Neither the Company Law nor 
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156 Notice of the Supreme People’s Court Concerning the Temporary Non-Acceptance of 
Securities Cases for Civil Compensation, (Sept. 21, 2001), available at http://www.chinainfo 
bank.com. 
157 Ji Wenhai, Zhongguo Remmin Daxue Sanwei Jiaoshou Tan Zhengquan Weifa Ji Chengzhi 
(Three Professors Talked about Violation of and Punishment for Illegal Acts on the Securities 
Markets), CHINESE ECON. TIMES, (Oct. 17, 2001), available at http://www.chinainfobank.com. 
158 Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Certain Issues Concerning the Acceptance of  Tort 
Cases Involving Misrepresentation on the Securities Market, (January 15, 2002), available at 
http://www.chinainfobank.com. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Trial of Civil Damages Cases Arising from Misrepresentation in the Securities Market Several 
Provisions, CHINA L. & PRAC. 53 (2003) (issued by the Supreme People’s Court on Jan. 9, 
2003, effective Feb. 1, 2003). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 2 [2004], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol39/iss2/3
2004] China's State-Owned Enterprises 369 
 
the Securities Law contain any provision giving the shareholders the 
right to bring derivative actions against corporate directors or managers 
for their wrongful activities.  Evidence in the United States “shows that 
lawsuits are more common in firms more likely to need monitoring . . . 
and that the probability of CEO turnover rises after a lawsuit is filed.”162  
Japan’s experience is also helpful.  According to Michael Gibson, the 
Assistant Director of the Federal Reserve Board, “[i]n October 1993, 
Japan’s Commercial Code was revised to reduce the fees required to file 
a derivative lawsuit.”163  Since then, derivative lawsuits have increased 
five times.164  These suits have heightened Japanese managers’ awareness 
of their duties to corporations and their shareholders.165  Law reform in 
China is also necessary in order to facilitate shareholder derivative 
actions, particularly when most of the listing companies in China are 
majority-controlled.  Among the 1124 listed companies in April 2001, 
seventy-nine percent were controlled by a shareholder who owned more 
than fifty percent of the shares.166  In sixty-five percent of the listed 
companies, State shareholding dominated. 167   This level of control 
further indicates that insiders control most of these listed companies.  
Without the threat of derivative actions, the protection of minority 
shareholder interests is unlikely. 
Still another factor contributing to the weak protection of minority 
shareholders is the low quality of certification by intermediaries.  When 
companies that raise capital cannot be trusted, third party certification 
plays important roles in solving the adverse selection problem.168  Third 
parties would include investment banks, accounting firms, and securities 
counsel.169  The principal role of securities intermediaries is to vouch for 
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disclosure quality and thereby reduce information asymmetry in 
securities markets.170  The system of third party certification works well, 
however, only when the securities intermediaries are subject to 
constraints.  Some of the constraints include self-regulation, licensing 
systems, civil liability to investors, and criminal liability.  
The role of self-regulatory organizations in China is currently too 
weak to curb serious securities fraud.  However, the licensing system, 
administered by the CSRC, works better in China.  For securities 
companies, including investment banks, a license from the CSRC is 
required.171  Qualified accounting firms still need a license jointly issued 
by the CSRC and the Ministry of Finance in order to do securities related 
accounting.172  During the last several years, the CSRC has suspended 
the licenses of and penalized many securities companies and accounting 
firms.173  Due to the limited resources of the CSRC, however, many 
wrongdoers are unlikely to be caught.  Under these circumstances, 
criminal and civil liability are needed to deter false certification.   
By the end of September 2002, there had not been a single case where 
an accounting firm or underwriter had been subject to criminal liability.  
As far as civil liability is concerned, holding accounting firms liable 
requires fraudulent misrepresentation.174  Since it is difficult to prove the 
intention of cheating, imposing civil liability on accounting firms will be 
very difficult.  Although it is relatively easy to catch securities 
underwriters committing negligent misrepresentation, or making 
important omissions that give rise to civil liability, there is not a single 
case where a securities underwriter has been sued.  The logic is simple. If 
issuers have rarely been held liable for the losses suffered by hundreds 
of thousands of investors, how can securities underwriters be held civilly 
liable for these losses?  When securities intermediaries are not subject to 
adequate constraints, the role of third party certification is considerably 
weakened. 
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Part II of this Article has pointed out that China’s stock market and 
the applicable laws were initially designed to improve the inefficient 
SOEs.175  If at the time of enterprise reform various governments knew 
that the SOEs were not efficiently managed and yet they urged these 
enterprises to go to the stock market for capital, it is unlikely that 
violations of imported, Western-type, securities regulations will be 
heavily penalized.  Strict enforcement of civil liability provisions is 
inconsistent with the political goal of maintaining some symbolicly-large 
SOEs in key sectors of the economy as many SOEs would be denied the 
benefit of using the supply of capital on the stock and became bankrupt.  
This explains the phenomenon of soft budget constraint on China’s 
capital market.  It also partly explains the weak enforcement of the law, 
which is a cause of the defect of market institutions.  
D. A Public Framework of Accountability 
While recognizing the benefits of privatization, Professor Martha 
Minow has also pointed out some concerns.176  One of the concerns is 
that “privatization can undermine a value as basic as guarding against 
the misuse of public funds.”177  According to Minow, “a shifting mix of 
public and private providers of education, welfare, and prison services” 
requires a system of public accountability: 
Privatization of public services soared precisely when 
major corporations engaged in unfettered private self-
dealing and one major religious group reeled from 
scandals, cover-ups, and mounting distrust among the 
faithful.  The coincidence in timing should be all the 
reminder anyone needs of the vital role of public 
oversight and checks and balances.178 
Professors Trebilcock and Iacobucci have already pointed out the 
fundamental problem with Minow’s article.179  Their view is that it is 
inadequate to move “directly from making observations about flaws in 
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private markets to drawing conclusions about the importance of 
maintaining public sector influence in various settings.”180 
The cases discussed in this section provide an interesting test 
ground.  If a public framework of accountability works well, such a 
system should be relevant to Chinese SOEs in which governments are 
heavily involved.  In the context of China, a public framework of 
accountability does not work well or cannot be easily established.  As 
most listed SOEs in China only provide non-public goods, it is 
unnecessary to discuss in detail non-instrumental values like democracy, 
equality, and pluralism. 
Accountability in the public framework means being “answerable to 
authority that can mandate desirable conduct and sanction conduct that 
breaches identified obligations.” 181   More specifically, accountability 
includes the use of contracts when working with private enterprises to 
deliver social services. 182   At a minimum, “[a] public framework of 
accountability for these activities would disclose the facts surrounding 
the contracting process to the public.”183  
The distribution of shares of SOEs in China involves (1) contractual 
arrangements with intermediaries and (2) disclosure of underwriters and 
the nature of the issuers.  In order to issue shares to the public, issuers 
are required to contract with accounting firms and securities companies, 
both of which are mainly SOEs.  When acting as securities underwriters, 
“securities companies must examine the truthfulness, accuracy and 
completeness of the public offer documents . . . . If they find that such 
documents contain any falsehoods, misleading statements or major 
omissions, they may not carry out the sales activities.”184  Issuers are also 
required by contract to get accounting firm verification of the financial 
and accounting reports of the company for the last three years. 185  
Furthermore, issuers must disclose detailed information about 
themselves to the CSRC and the public.186  Securities fraud in disclosing 
false or misleading information to the public persists despite these 
contractual arrangements and legal requirements. 
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Minow’s second model of public accountability imposes 
constitutional obligations on the government. 187   In the least, these 
“constitutional values are meant to guard against self-dealing or other 
conflicts of interest that arise when private parties are entrusted with 
public duties.”188   As part of the provisions of non-public goods or 
services carried out by SOEs in China, various rules against self dealing 
or other conflicts of interest are available.  These rules include party 
discipline and criminal and civil liability.  Party rules require that 
members of the Chinese Communist Party (“CPC”) shall not seek special 
interests or privileges except within the scope of law or policy. 189  
Violations of CPC rules may result in a warning, serious warning, 
removal of position within the CPC, putting the violator onto a 
monitoring list while keeping CPC membership, or expelling the violator 
from the CPC.190  In a country always ruled by one party, the loss of 
party membership is a significant and real burden.  In addition, criminal 
law penalizes misconduct of managers and directors related to bribery,191 
competition with the company,192 and seeking self interest or interest for 
friends. 193   Moreover, Company Law also prohibits or restricts self-
dealing or conflicts of interest transactions.194  Despite all these rules, 
connected transactions between parent companies and subsidiaries or 
between associated companies of SOEs are very frequent, harming the 
interest of minority shareholders.  Statistics show that 84.6% of the listed 
companies carried out connected transactions in 1997.195  While seeking 
personal gains in conflicts of interest transactions will be heavily 
penalized, connected transactions between associated companies of 
SOEs rarely attract legal liability.196 This situation again shows the failure 
of public accountability as it relates to public involvement in the 
provision of goods and services in China. 
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A third model of accountability advocated by Minow is 
administration. 197   While it is not easy to specify the content of 
administration, the term requires the collection of information so that 
providers of goods or services can be properly chosen, assessed, and 
monitored. 198   The case of China shows that Minow’s approach is 
unlikely to succeed.  To ensure the quality of the issuers and to control 
development of the stock market, the Chinese Government specified a 
quota for the distribution of shares by issuers in China in the early and 
middle 1990s. 199   To get a quota, potential issuers had to apply to 
provincial governments or ministries under the State Council for 
approval. 200   The locally selected companies had to obtain  further 
approval from the CSRC, which also consulted the then State Economic 
and Trade Commission and the State Development and Planning 
Commission.201  Despite the heavy involvement of various government 
agencies, abuse of the process was widespread as discussed in the early 
part of this section. 
The fourth legal model for public accountability advocated by 
Minow is democracy.202   According to Minow, “Democracy involves 
both the processes and values committed to governance by the 
people.” 203   Minow further asserts that “[d]isclosure of relevant 
information, accompanied by periodic occasions for the expression of 
public views on [certain] decisions and the standards set and used to 
assess them, would” enhance democratic values.204  While China has 
never adopted any Western democratic form of government, the concept 
and system of socialism reflects a value of rule by the people.  In a rigid 
socialist country, the means of production were all in the hands of the 
State.  Employees or people in general were the masters of enterprises 
and the country.  Rational passivity and free rider problems, however, 
led people to the direction of irresponsibility.  The vehicle of SOEs was 
originally intended to better serve the people who were the residual 
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claimants of SOEs.  The reality, however, did not properly reflect the 
socialist ideal. 
Widespread securities fraud in China’s listed SOEs reveals the 
failure of the system of public accountability.  It is puzzling why a public 
framework of accountability along the line advocated by Minow does 
not work in China or cannot be developed to better deal with the waste 
of public resources in SOEs.  Trebilcock and Iacobucci doubt whether 
public accountability mechanisms work to discipline public actors.205  
They conclude that the features that undermine the market often 
undermine public provision of goods or services as well.206 
If a public framework of accountability does not work well in the 
case of public provision of goods by using the vehicle of SOEs, it is 
doubtful whether such a public framework works to discipline private 
actors.  At least, “the imposition of legal accountability or other 
constraints on the private sector may entail costs in terms of reduced 
competition, innovation, and flexibility, which may negate any 
advantages of private sector over public sector provision.”207 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
This Article uses the example of takeovers and securities fraud to 
examine why the imported, Western-style of takeover law or securities 
regulation cannot be fully enforced in China.  The political goal of 
maintaining the control of a large number of State-owned listed 
companies appears to be a significant contributing factor to why China 
cannot fully utilize the benefits of Western law in the establishment of a 
market-oriented economy.  If China wants to successfully compete in a 
globalized economy, the Chinese government has to seriously consider 
the issue of whether it should withdraw or considerably reduce the 
ownership in the large number of State-owned listed companies.  The 
two examples can be extended to other areas to show that the 
institutional defects in State-owned companies do not provide adequate 
means to motivate managers and directors in these companies to work 
for the best interest of their companies or adequate means to discipline 
the managers and directors if they do not work for the best interest of the 
companies they serve.  During the transition from a planned economy to 
a market-oriented economy, corporate governance matters, particularly 
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after China’s accession to the World Trade Organization, within which 
China has to compete with other developed nations under similar 
background rules. 
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